Strategic Reasons for Patenting: Between Exclusion and Coordination Rationales

Antoine Bureth (), Rachel Levy (), Julien Pénin () and Sandrine Wolff ()
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Antoine Bureth: BETA, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg 1
Sandrine Wolff: BETA, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg 1

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2005, vol. 95, issue 5, 19-46

Abstract: This contribution aims at analyzing the role of patents in inter-organization networks in the field of biotechnology. We examine the traditional rationale for firms to apply for a patent, which focuses on the protection against competition as the basic motive of application, and we claim that another, complementary motive should be explicitly taken into account: The role of patent as a negotiation and/or cooperation instrument. We illustrate our main propositions through the case study of an emergent network, namely the cluster of Upper-Rhine Biovalley.

JEL-codes: L00 L65 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Reasons for Patenting: Between Exclusion and Coordination Rationales (2008)
Working Paper: Strategic Reasons for Patenting: Between Exclusion and Coordination Rationales (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:19-46

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