Strategic Reasons for Patenting: Between Exclusion and Coordination Rationales

Antoine Bureth (), Rachel Levy (), Julien Pénin () and Sandrine Wolff ()
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Antoine Bureth: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Rachel Levy: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Sandrine Wolff: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This contribution aims at analyzing the role of patents in inter-organization networks in the field of biotechnology. We examine the traditionnal rationale for firms to apply for a patent, which focuses on the protection against competition as the basic motive of application, and we claim that another, complementary motive should be explicitly taken into account : the role of patent as a negotiation and/or cooperation instrument. We illustrate our main propositions through the case study of an emergent network, namely the cluster of Upper-Rhine Biovalley.

Date: 2006
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Published in Economia & Lavoro - Rivista di politica economica, sociologia e relazioni industriali, 2006, pp.19-46

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Reasons for Patenting: Between Exclusion and Coordination Rationales (2008)
Journal Article: Strategic Reasons for Patenting: Between Exclusion and Coordination Rationales (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279139

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