Temporary Workers and Direct Voting Systems for Workers’ Representation

Miguel Malo

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2006, vol. 27, issue 3, 505-535

Abstract: In this article, the author analyses whether in direct voting systems of workers’ representation the voting probability is affected by the contract type, using the Spanish union elections as a ‘natural’ experiment. Although temporary workers are formally covered by this electoral system, the author finds that it strongly discourages the participation of temporary workers in elections. The main consequence is that unions have fewer incentives to include temporary workers’ preferences in collective bargaining, and temporary workers lose an institutional channel to pressure for improvements in their inferior working conditions. The importance of other channels to include interests of temporary workers in unions’ strategies (such as membership) is discussed as well.

Keywords: fixed-term contracts; outsiders; union elections; unions; working conditions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:505-535

DOI: 10.1177/0143831X06065966

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