Voting for Wage Concessions: The Case of the 1982 GM-UAW Negotiations

Bruce Kaufman and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez ()

ILR Review, 1988, vol. 41, issue 2, 183-194

Abstract: The authors of this paper use the median voter model to predict the patterns of rank-and-file voting on wage concessions in a multiplant setting, then test those predictions using data from the 1982 GM-UAW negotiations. The model predicts that workers in plants with large layoffs will vote in favor of a wage concession only if they believe that a concession will save their jobs. Surprisingly, workers in plants with growing or stable employment are also actually more likely to vote Yes. A third prediction is that the Yes vote will be smallest in plants with the most adversarial labor relations. The empirical analysis supports all three predictions.

Date: 1988
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://ilr.sagepub.com/content/41/2/183.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:41:y:1988:i:2:p:183-194

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in ILR Review from Cornell University, ILR School
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().