Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information
Maria Levati (),
Matthias Sutter () and
Eline van der Heijden
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Eline van der Heijden: Department of Economics and CentER Tilburg University, Netherlands
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2007, vol. 51, issue 5, 793-818
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if participants do not know the distribution of endowments. Granting the leaders exclusion power does not lead to significantly higher contributions.
Keywords: public goods experiment; leadership; exclusion; heterogeneous endowments; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:5:p:793-818
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