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Sequential versus Simultaneous Schelling Models: Experimental Evidence

Juan Benito (), Pablo Brañas-Garza, Penélope Hernández and Juan A. Sanchis Llopis ()
Additional contact information
Pablo Brañas-Garza: Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Granada, and GLOBE, Spain, pbg@ugr.es
Penélope Hernández: Departamento de Análisis Económico, Universitat de València, and ERI-CES, Spain

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pablo Brañas-Garza

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2011, vol. 55, issue 1, 60-84

Abstract: This article shows the results of experiments where subjects play the Schelling’s spatial proximity model. Two types of experiments are conducted: one in which choices are made sequentially and a variation of the first where the decision making is simultaneous. The results of the sequential experiments are identical to Schelling’s prediction: subjects finish in a segregated equilibrium. Likewise, in the variant of the simultaneous decision experiment, the same result is reached: segregation. Subjects’ heterogeneity generates a series of focal points in the first round. To locate themselves, subjects use these focal points immediately, and as a result, the segregation takes place again. Furthermore, simultaneous experiments with commuting costs allow us to conclude that introducing positive moving costs does not affect segregation.

Keywords: Schelling models; economic experiments; segregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/55/1/60.abstract (text/html)

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Working Paper: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Schelling Models: Experimental Evidence (2010) Downloads
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