Race and the Evaluation of Signal Callers in the National Football League

David Berri and Rob Simmons
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Rob Simmons: Lancaster University, r.simmons@lancaster.ac.uk

Journal of Sports Economics, 2009, vol. 10, issue 1, 23-43

Abstract: Until recently, the position of quarterback in the National Football League (NFL) was not an option for Black athletes. Today, many teams use Black quarterbacks, a development that might suggest race is no longer relevant when it comes to the evaluation of signal callers in the NFL. By modeling quarterback performance and salary over 1995-2006, we find that Black quarterbacks are more likely to run with the football, yet this skill is not compensated in the market. Furthermore, we find evidence of performance-related salary discrimination against Black quarterbacks in the top half of the salary distribution.

Keywords: quarterback; salary; race; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Race and the Evaluation of Signal Callers in the National Football League (2008)
Working Paper: Race and the evaluation of signal callers in the national football league (2007)
Working Paper: Race and evaluation of signal callers in the National Football League (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:10:y:2009:i:1:p:23-43

DOI: 10.1177/1527002508327383

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