A Strategic Rationale for the Use of Sell–On Fees in European Sports

Oliver Gürtler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Oliver Gürtler

Journal of Sports Economics, 2012, vol. 13, issue 1, 76-84

Abstract: In European team sports, contracts that govern the transfer of a player from one club to another often contain a clause specifying a sell-on fee. Such clause ensures that the selling club profits from a future transfer of the player. This article gives possible explanations for the use of sell-on fees. Besides rather obvious explanations based on risk considerations and wealth constraints, the article shows that a sell-on fee could be used for strategic reasons. In particular, the clubs may agree on a sell-on fee since it affects the behavior of the buying club in future transfer negotiations in a favorable way.

Keywords: sell-on fee; sports; negotiation; transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:13:y:2012:i:1:p:76-84

DOI: 10.1177/1527002510392706

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