On the Release of Players to National Teams

Oliver Gürtler, Markus Lang and Tim Pawlowski
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Oliver Gürtler

Journal of Sports Economics, 2015, vol. 16, issue 7, 695-713

Abstract: The release of players from a club to the national team often leads to a conflict concerning the duration of the players’ stay with the national team. Based on a theoretical bargaining model, we examine whether intervention in this conflict by a governing body is desirable. We show that bargaining between the club and the national federation yields a socially inefficient outcome if financial compensation is either prohibited or limited. If, however, the national federation is allowed to pay unlimited financial compensation to the club, it is not necessary to intervene in the negotiations because the bargaining outcome will be socially optimal.

Keywords: national team; release of players; compensation payment; bargaining; team sports (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
Working Paper: On the Release of Players to National Teams (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:16:y:2015:i:7:p:695-713

DOI: 10.1177/1527002513503173

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