Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance

Stefan Késenne
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Stefan Késenne: University of Antwerp
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Stefan Kesenne

Journal of Sports Economics, 2005, vol. 6, issue 1, 98-106

Abstract: This short article, challenging the so-called invariance proposition, argues that, for a general n-team model with profit-maximizing clubs and concave revenue functions, there are reasons to believe that revenue sharing can worsen the competitive balance among teams in a professional sports league. If clubs are win maximizers, revenue sharing improves the competitive balance.

Keywords: sports economics; professional team sports; competitive balance; revenue sharing; invariance principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:6:y:2005:i:1:p:98-106

DOI: 10.1177/1527002503259334

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