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Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation

Leonardo Boncinelli, Alessio Muscillo () and Paolo Pin
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Alessio Muscillo: Università di Siena

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022, vol. 12, issue 4, No 5, 1129 pages

Abstract: Abstract Motivated by data on co-authorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional stability, where agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and stochastic stability, where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize the overall number of activities performed by teams.

Keywords: Team formation; Stochastic stability; Coalitional stability; Myopic team-wise stability; Networks; Co-authorship; C72; C73; D85; I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation (2014) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00438-y

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