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Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation

Leonardo Boncinelli (), Alessio Muscillo and Paolo Pin

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional stability, where agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and stochastic stability, where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize the overall number of activities performed by teams.

Date: 2021-03, Revised 2021-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-ore
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.13712 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation (2014) Downloads
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