Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation

Leonardo Boncinelli () and Paolo Pin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional stability, where agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and stochastic stability, where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize the overall number of activities performed by teams.

Keywords: team formation; stochastic stability; coalitional stability; networks; marriage theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56356/1/MPRA_paper_56356.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation (2022)
Working Paper: Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:56356

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().