Wage subsidies and hiring chances for the disabled: some causal evidence

Stijn Baert

The European Journal of Health Economics, 2016, vol. 17, issue 1, 86 pages

Abstract: This study evaluated the effectiveness of wage subsidies as a policy instrument to integrate disabled individuals into the labor market. To identify causal effects, a large-scale field experiment was conducted in Belgium. The results show that the likelihood of a disabled candidate receiving a positive response to a job application is not positively influenced by disclosing entitlement to the Flemish Supporting Subsidy. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Keywords: Economics of health; Labor market policy evaluation; Wage subsidies; Disability; Discrimination; I38; J14; J78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Wage Subsidies and Hiring Chances for the Disabled: Some Causal Evidence (2014)
Working Paper: Wage Subsidies and Hiring Chances for the Disabled: Some Causal Evidence (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:17:y:2016:i:1:p:71-86

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DOI: 10.1007/s10198-014-0656-7

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