Wage Subsidies and Hiring Chances for the Disabled: Some Causal Evidence

Stijn Baert

No 8318, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We evaluate the effectiveness of wage subsidies as a policy instrument to integrate disabled individuals into the labour market. To identify causal effects, we conduct a large-scale field experiment in Belgium. Our results show that the likelihood of a disabled candidate receiving a positive response to a job application is not positively influenced by revealing entitlement to the Flemish Supporting Subsidy.

Keywords: wage subsidies; disability; labour market policy evaluation; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I38 J14 J78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published - revised version published in: European Journal of Health Economics , 2016, 17, 71 - 86

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Related works:
Journal Article: Wage subsidies and hiring chances for the disabled: some causal evidence (2016)
Working Paper: Wage Subsidies and Hiring Chances for the Disabled: Some Causal Evidence (2014)
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