Revisiting gender differences in ultimatum bargaining: experimental evidence from the US and China

Shuwen Li, Xiangdong Qin and Daniel Houser
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Xiangdong Qin: Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2018, vol. 4, issue 2, No 7, 180-190

Abstract: Abstract We report results from a replication of Solnick (Econ Inq 39(2):189, 2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnick’s (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large Chinese university. We find little evidence of gender differences across proposer and responder decisions in both locations.

Keywords: Gender differences; Cultural differences; Laboratory experiment; Ultimatum game; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 J16 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0054-5

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