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Revisiting Gender Differences in Ultimatum Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from the US and China

Shuwen Li, Xiandong Qin () and Daniel Houser ()
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Xiandong Qin: Department of Applied Economics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

No 1064, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Abstract: We report results from a replication of Solnick (2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnick’s (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large Chinese university. We find little evidence of gender differences across proposer and responder decisions in both locations. We do however find that, in comparison to Chinese participants, US proposers are more generous, while US responders are more demanding.

Keywords: gender differences; cultural differences; laboratory experiment; ultimatum game; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 J16 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-exp, nep-gen, nep-gth and nep-ltv
Date: 2017-10
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