On the effectiveness of elected male and female leaders and team coordination

Ernesto Reuben and Krisztina Timko ()
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Krisztina Timko: University of Helsinki

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2018, vol. 4, issue 2, No 3, 123-135

Abstract: Abstract We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader’s gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams with elected leaders coordinate on higher effort levels. Initially, the benefits of being elected are captured solely by male leaders. However, this gender difference disappears with repeated interaction because unsuccessful male leaders are reelected more often than unsuccessful female leaders.

Keywords: Gender differences; Leadership; Democracy effect; Leader effectiveness; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 J16 M14 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: On the Effectiveness of Elected Male and Female Leaders and Team Coordination (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0056-3

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