On the Effectiveness of Elected Male and Female Leaders and Team Coordination

Ernesto Reuben and Krisztina Timko ()
Additional contact information
Krisztina Timko: University of Helsinki

No 10497, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader's gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly-selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams with elected leaders coordinate on higher effort levels. Initially, the benefits of being elected are enjoyed solely by male leaders. However, this gender difference disappears with repeated interaction as unsuccessful male leaders are reelected more often than unsuccessful female leaders.

Keywords: gender differences; leadership; democracy effect; leader effectiveness; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 J16 M14 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gen and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published - published in: Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2018, 4, 123-135

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp10497.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the effectiveness of elected male and female leaders and team coordination (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10497

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().