The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding
Keith Waehrer ()
Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 1, 181 pages
In the model presented, a buyer uses competitive bidding to facilitate her purchase of a good (the primary good of the exchange). Not included in the original purchase is the possible procurement of a good related to the original purchase: the supplementary good. The primary and supplementary goods are closely related; knowing a bidder's cost of producing the primary good implies that the buyer can infer the bidder's cost of producing the supplementary good. I show that a bidding mechanism for the primary good will fail to ensure an efficient allocation if the buyer learns the bid of the winner and the price of the supplementary good is determined through sequential bargaining.
JEL-codes: C78 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Received: August 22, 1996; revised version: June 23, 1997
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