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Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information

Lutz-Alexander Busch and Ignatius Horstmann

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 3, 575 pages

Abstract: While actual bargaining features many issues and decision making on the order in which issues are negotiated and resolved, the typical models of bargaining do not. Instead, they have either a single issue or many issues resolved in some fixed order, typically simultaneously. This paper shows that, when there is incomplete information, such an approach removes an important avenue for information transmission: the bargaining agenda itself. Compared to the standard model, pooling on offers by the informed is reduced and a signaling equilibrium arises when the agenda is determined endogenously. Signaling is carried out by use of an issue-by-issue bargaining agenda.

Keywords: Multi-issue; bargaining; ·; Agenda; bargaining; ·; Incomplete; information; ·; Signaling. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-04-15
Note: Received: September 3, 1997; revised version: May 11, 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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