Stochastic evolution with slow learning

Alan Beggs

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 19, issue 2, 379-405

Abstract: This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but making selection strong does.

Keywords: Equilibrium selection; Diffusion approximation; Evolutionary game theory; Risk dominance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-29
Note: Received: January 19, 2000; revised version: September 25, 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/2019002/20190379.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning (2000)
Working Paper: Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:379-405

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().