Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning

Alan Beggs

No 33, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but making selection strong does.

Keywords: equilibrium selection; diffusion approximation; evolutionary game theory; risk dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:400df858-2bd1-4cd4-aa0e-3db05037df7c (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stochastic evolution with slow learning (2002)
Working Paper: Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:33

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Pouliquen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).