Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information

Roman Inderst

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 22, issue 2, 419-429

Abstract: This paper considers bargaining with one-sided private information and alternating offers where an agreement specifies both a transfer and an additional (sorting) variable. Moreover, both sides can propose menus. We show that for a subset of parameters the alternating-offer game has a unique equilibrium where efficient contracts are implemented in the first period. This stands in sharp contrast to the benchmarks of contract theory, where typically only the uninformed side proposes, and bargaining theory, where typically the agreement only specifies a transfer. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Screening; Bargaining.; JEL Classification Numbers:C78; D82. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0290-y

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