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Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case

Bruno Jullien (), Bernard Salanié () and François Salanié ()

Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 30, issue 1, 151-169

Keywords: Risk aversion; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Screening; D82; G2; G22; J41; J7; L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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