Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
Bruno Jullien (),
Bernard Salanié () and
François Salanié ()
Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 30, issue 1, 151-169
Keywords: Risk aversion; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Screening; D82; G2; G22; J41; J7; L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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