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Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism

Itai Sher ()

Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 50, issue 2, 387 pages

Keywords: Shill bidding; VCG mechanism; Combinatorial auctions; Winner determination problem; Collusion; C72; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism (2009) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0566-6

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