Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma
Caleb Cox,
Matthew Jones (),
Kevin Pflum () and
Paul Healy ()
Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 58, issue 3, 484 pages
Abstract:
In a sequential-move, finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game (FRPD), cooperation can be sustained if the first-mover believes her opponent might be a behavioral type who plays a tit-for-tat strategy in every period. We test this theory by revealing second-mover histories from an earlier FRPD experiment to their current opponent. Despite eliminating the possibility of reputation-building, aggregate cooperation actually increases when histories are revealed. Cooperative histories lead to increased trust, but negative histories do not cause decreased trust. We develop a behavioral model to explain these findings. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Keywords: Prisoners’ dilemma; Finitely repeated games; Cooperation; Reputation-building; C70; C73; C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:58:y:2015:i:3:p:441-484
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1
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