From teleology to evolution

Siegfried Berninghaus (), Werner Güth () and Hartmut Kliemt

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2003, vol. 13, issue 4, 385-410

Abstract: This paper focuses on the uneasy alliance of rational choice and evolutionary explanations in modern economics. While direct evolutionary explanations rule out "purposeful" rational choice by assuming "zero-intelligence" and pure rational choice explanations leave no room for "selective" adaptation, the indirect evolutionary approach integrates both perspectives. Subsequently we go stepwise "from teleology to evolution" and thereby study the model spectrum ranging from pure rational choice over indirect to direct evolutionary approaches. We believe that knowledge of this spectrum can help us to choose more adequate models of economic behavior that incorporate both teleological and evolutionary elements. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Indirect evolution; Rational choice; Trust game; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joevec:v:13:y:2003:i:4:p:385-410

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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-003-0161-0

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