Decentralized versus collective bargaining - An experimental study

S. Berninghaus, H.-J. Ramser, Werner Güth () and R. Lechler
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S. Berninghaus: Institut für Statistik u. Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany
H.-J. Ramser: Fakultät f. Volkswirtschaftslehre u. Statistik, Universität Konstanz, 78464 Konstanz, Germany
R. Lechler: Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 10178 Berlin, Germany

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 3, 437-448

Abstract: Two parties X, and Y, can either bargain separately with a third party Z or merge to become XY and bargain collectively with Z. Depending on the payoff implications of the two possible contracts and on the asymmetry inherent in the conflict payoffs of X and Y collective bargaining will increase, decrease or leave constant what X and Y achieve together. In the experiment, first X and Y vote for or against collective bargaining and then negotiate accordingly. Participants react adequately to strategic aspects, but not as predicted by the (Nash-)bargaining solution.

Keywords: Cooperative; bargaining; ·; cooperative; Nash-solution; ·; bargaining; power; ·; bargaining; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-20
Note: Received: April 2000/Final version: December 2001
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