Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

Juan I. Block () and David Levine
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Juan I. Block: University of Cambridge

International Journal of Game Theory, 2016, vol. 45, issue 4, No 9, 984 pages

Abstract: Abstract We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting.

Keywords: Repeated game; Folk theorem; Self-referential game; Approximate equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games (2012)
Working Paper: Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2

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