Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games

Juan I. Block and David Levine

No 2012-031, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent?s intentions. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents? play: direct observation of the opponent?s code-of-conduct, and indirect observation of the opponent?s play in a repeated setting.

Keywords: Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games (2016)
Working Paper: Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games (2012)
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