Daddy months

Volker Meier and Helmut Rainer

Journal of Population Economics, 2017, vol. 30, issue 3, No 5, 875-892

Abstract: Abstract We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income, and fertility. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to have a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms other types of couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.

Keywords: Fertility; Bargaining; Family policy; Labor supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H21 J13 J18 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00148-016-0631-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Daddy months (2017)
Working Paper: Daddy Months (2014)
Working Paper: Daddy Months (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:30:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00148-016-0631-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... tion/journal/148/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00148-016-0631-y

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Population Economics is currently edited by K.F. Zimmermann

More articles in Journal of Population Economics from Springer, European Society for Population Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().