Daddy Months

Volker Meier and Helmut Rainer

No 5033, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to have a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms cooperative couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.

Keywords: fertility; bargaining; family policy; labor supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H21 J13 J18 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Journal Article: Daddy months (2017)
Working Paper: Daddy months (2017)
Working Paper: Daddy Months (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5033

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