Daddy months

Volker Meier and Helmut Rainer

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income, and fertility. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to have a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms other types of couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Population Economics 3 30(2017): pp. 875-892

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Journal Article: Daddy months (2017)
Working Paper: Daddy Months (2014)
Working Paper: Daddy Months (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:49922

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