Process Spillovers and Growth: A Comment on the Existence of a Stable Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium

Shravan Luckraz

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2011, vol. 149, issue 1, No 12, 229-237

Abstract: Abstract In a recent paper Luckraz (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 139:315–335, 2008) develops a differential game model to show that a lack of intellectual property protection can improve economic growth in economies, where large technology gaps prevail. However, this conclusion depends crucially on the fact that the closed-loop equilibrium of the model degenerates to the open-loop equilibrium. This note generalizes the results of Luckraz by formulating a setup in which the closed-loop equilibrium does not degenerate to the open-loop equilibrium of the differential game.

Keywords: Research and development (R&D) games; Cournot competition; Applied differential games; Closed-loop equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-010-9781-3

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