What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis

Nicolas Jacquemet () and Adam Zylbersztejn ()

Review of Economic Design, 2014, vol. 18, issue 4, 243-264

Abstract: Experiments based on the Beard and Beil (Manag Sci 40(2):252–262, 1994 ) two-player coordination game robustly show that coordination failures arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects are not willing to rely on others’ self-interested maximization, and (ii) self-interested maximization is not ubiquitous. Such behavior is often considered to challenge the relevance of subgame perfectness as an equilibrium selection criterion, since weakly dominated strategies are actually used. We report on new experiments investigating whether inequality in payoffs between players, maintained in most lab implementations of this game, drives such behavior. Our data clearly show that the failure to maximize personal payoffs, as well as the fear that others might act this way, do not stem from inequality aversion. This result is robust to varying the saliency of decisions, repetition-based learning and cultural differences between France and Poland. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Coordination failure; Subgame perfectness; Non-credible threats; Laboratory experiments; Social preferences; Inequality aversion; C72; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2014)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2014)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2014)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2011)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2011)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-014-0162-5

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