What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis

Nicolas Jacquemet () and Adam Zylbersztejn ()

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) game, second movers very often fail to select the decision that maximizes both players payoff. This note reports on a new experimental treatment, in which we neutralize the potential effect of inequality aversion on the likelihood of this behavior. We show this behavior is robust to this change, even after allowing for repetition-based learning

Keywords: Coordination failure; laboratory experiments; aversion to inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11036.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2014)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2014)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2014)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2014)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2011)
Working Paper: What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11036

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