What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis

Nicolas Jacquemet () and Adam Zylbersztejn ()
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Nicolas Jacquemet: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Adam Zylbersztejn: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) game, second movers very often fail to select the decision that maximizes both players payoff. This note reports on a new experimental treatment, in which we neutralize the potential effect of inequality aversion on the likelihood of this behavior. We show this behavior is robust to this change, even after allowing for repetition-based learning.

Keywords: Coordination failure; laboratory experiments; aversion to inequality; aversion à l'inégalité; Défauts de coordination; expériences en laboratoire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-27
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00611696v1
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