Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization

Rene van den Brink (), Agnieszka Rusinowska and Frank Steffen

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 41, issue 3, 683 pages

Abstract: Opinion leaders are actors who have some power over their followers as they are able to influence their followers’ choice of action in certain instances. In van den Brink et al. (Homo Oeconomicus 28:161–185, 2011 ) we proposed a two-action model for societies with opinion leaders. We introduced a power and a satisfaction score and studied some common properties. In this paper we strengthen two of these properties and present two further properties, which allows us to axiomatize both scores for the case that followers require unanimous action inclinations of their opinion leaders to follow them independently from their own action inclinations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Collective choice; Follower; Opinion leader; Power; Satisfaction; Axiomatization; D71; D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization (2011)
Working Paper: Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization (2011)
Working Paper: Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization (2011)
Working Paper: Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0699-6

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