Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism
Amihai Glazer and
Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 48, issue 4, 887-900
Abstract An incumbent who can shift the cost of action to a successor may choose to avoid incurring the cost of an action the incumbent favors, resulting in delay. The delay will be longer the closer the preferences of officials to each other, the higher the fixed cost of action, and the higher the discount rate. Incumbents with moderate preferences have a greater incentive to postpone action than do extremists.
Keywords: Discount Rate; Ideal Point; Fixed Cost; Capital Spending; Heterogeneous Preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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