EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action

Jose Castillo (), Zhicheng Xu (), Ping Zhang () and Xianchen Zhu ()
Additional contact information
Ping Zhang: Shenzhen University
Xianchen Zhu: Nanjing University of Science and Technology

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 56, issue 2, No 7, 385-419

Abstract: Abstract Most observed institutional arrangements, in governments, firms, and other organizations, acknowledge the effectiveness of imposing sanctioning institutions and monitoring policies to achieve particular goals. However, less attention has been paid to the influences of the delegation mechanism of sanctioning power. In particular, it remains unclear whether the mechanism influences the legitimacy of the authority/institution, in centralized institutional arrangements. We report laboratory-experimental results of a public goods game that compare the performance of exogenous (i.e., the Leviathan) versus endogenous (i.e., the Democracy) delegation of sanctioning power. Observed differences are not statistically significant, regardless of the effectiveness of sanctions imposed, tested in two experiments with different punishment/cost functions. Democratic schemes in centralized power environments should not be taken for granted. Experimental evidence contradicts the common belief of a robust causal relationship between indirect democratic institutions, collective action, and economic outcomes.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-020-01284-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:56:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01284-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01284-w

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2021-09-25
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:56:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01284-w