Quadratic funding with incomplete information
Luis Mota Freitas () and
Wilfredo Maldonado ()
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Luis Mota Freitas: Northwestern University
Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, vol. 64, issue 1, No 3, 43-67
Abstract:
Abstract Quadratic funding is a public good provision mechanism that satisfies desirable theoretical properties, such as efficiency under complete information, and has been gaining popularity in practical applications. We evaluate this mechanism in a setting of incomplete information regarding individual preferences, and show that this result only holds under knife-edge conditions. We also estimate the inefficiency of the mechanism in a variety of settings, and characterize circumstances in which inefficiency increases with population size. We show how these findings can be used to estimate the mechanism’s inefficiency in a wide range of situations under incomplete information.
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Quadratic Funding with Incomplete Information (2021) 
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01512-7
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