Quadratic Funding with Incomplete Information

Luis V. M. Freitas () and Wilfredo Maldonado ()

No 2021_24, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: A recently proposed mechanism for the provision of continuous public goods is the so-called quadratic funding mechanism, which has been shown to provide socially optimal outcomes under complete information. In this work we show that the conditions to obtain the same desirable property under incomplete information are strongly restrictive. We also propose two measures for the size of the inefficiency and show how that deadweight loss responds to changes in the size of the population, the valuation of the public good by individuals and the variance of the expected value of contributions to the fund.

Keywords: Public goods provision; incomplete information; quadratic funding mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-isf and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Quadratic funding with incomplete information (2025)
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