Subjective performance appraisal and inequality aversion

Christian Grund and Judith Przemeck

Applied Economics, 2012, vol. 44, issue 17, 2149-2155

Abstract: Making use of a subjective performance appraisal system, it is a well-established fact that many supervisors tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary across employees of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a simple theoretical model and discuss determinants of the size of the biases.

Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2011.560109 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Subjective Performance Appraisal and Inequality Aversion (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:44:y:2012:i:17:p:2149-2155

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.560109

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().