Subjective Performance Appraisal and Inequality Aversion

Christian Grund and Judith Przemeck ()
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Judith Przemeck: Department of Economics - Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

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Abstract: Making use of a subjective performance appraisal system, it is a well established fact that many supervisors tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary across employees of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a simple theoretical model and discuss determinants of the size of the biases.

Keywords: Social; Sciences; &; Humanities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-15
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00687808v1
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Published in Applied Economics, 2011, pp.1. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2011.560109⟩

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Journal Article: Subjective performance appraisal and inequality aversion (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00687808

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.560109

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