Interlocking directorships and patenting coordination

Michele Bernini, Georgios Efthyvoulou, Ian Gregory-Smith (), Jolian McHardy and Antonio Navas

Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2021, vol. 30, issue 4, 382-411

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate the role interlocking directorships play in the patenting activities of UK companies and provide further insights into the channels through which this relationship emerges. We develop a theoretical model that identifies interlocking directorships as a mechanism for resolving property rights conflicts. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong relationship between interlocking and patenting behaviour and finds that interlocking leads to a higher number of successful patent applications, particularly for those firms located in technology-intensive industries.

Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Interlocking Directorships and Patenting Coordination (2014)
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DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2019.1710026

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