Interlocking Directorships and Patenting Coordination

Michele Bernini, Georgios Efthyvoulou, Ian Gregory-Smith (), Jolian McHardy and Antonio Navas ()

No 2014016, Working Papers from The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate the role interlocking directorships play in the patenting activities of UK companies and provide further insights into the channels through which this relationship emerges. Our empirical analysis produces three main results: first, interlocking leads to a higher number of successful patent applications; second, interlocked firms are more likely to cite each other's patents, especially around the moment of interlocking; and, third, interlocked companies tend to increase the technological similarity of their patent portfolio in the immediate period following their first interlock. To rationalise these results, we develop a theoretical model that identifies interlocking directorships as a practice that prevents property right conflicts that often arise between firms that are technologically close to each other.

Keywords: patents; director networks; knowledge spillovers; patent coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 G30 J49 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/economics/research/serps/articles/2014_016 First version, October 2014 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Interlocking directorships and patenting coordination (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:shf:wpaper:2014016

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