Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance

Simon Ashby (), Swee-Hoon Chuah () and Robert Hoffmann

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2004, vol. 11, issue 1, 91-106

Abstract: We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this article presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. We discuss the advertising, press and life insurance industries in the UK as examples of the scenarios. Conclusions for corporate and public policy are offered.

Keywords: Industry Self-regulation; Voluntary Compliance; Game Theory; Public Goods; Collective Action; JEL Classifications: C72; D7; H11; K20; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2003)
Working Paper: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2003)
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DOI: 10.1080/1357151032000172255

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