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Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance

Simon Ashby (), Swee-Hoon Chuah () and Robert Hoffmann ()

Occasional Papers from Nottingham University Business School

Abstract: We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.

Keywords: industry self-regulation; voluntary compliance; game theory; public goods; collective action. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D7 H11 K20 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2003-04-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2004) Downloads
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