Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance

Simon Ashby (simon.ashby@vlerick.com), Swee-Hoon Chuah (sweehoon.chuah@utas.edu.au) and Robert Hoffmann (jroberthoffmann@me.com)

Occasional Papers from Industrial Economics Division

Abstract: We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.

Keywords: industry self-regulation; voluntary compliance; game theory; public goods; collective action. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D7 H11 K20 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2003-04-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2004)
Working Paper: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2003)
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