Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance
Simon Ashby (),
Swee-Hoon Chuah () and
Robert Hoffmann ()
Occasional Papers from Industrial Economics Division
We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.
Keywords: industry self-regulation; voluntary compliance; game theory; public goods; collective action. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D7 H11 K20 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/%7Elizecon/RePEc/pdf/selfreg.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/%7Elizecon/RePEc/pdf/selfreg.pdf)
Journal Article: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2004)
Working Paper: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nub:occpap:3
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Occasional Papers from Industrial Economics Division Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Robert Hoffmann ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).